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ABSTRACT 
Empirical explosion data from full scale solid rocket launch vehicle accidents and tests 
were collected from all available literature from the 1950s to the present.  In general data included 
peak blast overpressure, blast impulse, fragment size, fragment speed, and fragment dispersion.  
Most propellants were 1.1 explosives but a few were 1.3.  Oftentimes the data from a single 
accident was disjointed and/or missing key aspects.  Despite this fact, once the data as a whole 
was digitized, categorized, and plotted clear trends appeared.  Particular emphasis was placed 
on tests or accidents that would be applicable to scenarios from which a crew might need to 
escape.  Therefore, such tests where a large quantity of high explosive was used to initiate the 
solid rocket explosion were differentiated.  Also, high speed ground impacts or tests used to 
simulate such were also culled.   It was found that the explosions from all accidents and 
applicable tests could be described using only the pressurized gas energy stored in the chamber 
at the time of failure.  Additionally, fragmentation trends were produced.  Only one accident 
mentioned the elusive “small” propellant fragments, but upon further analysis it was found that 
these were most likely produced as secondary fragments when larger primary fragments 
impacted the ground.  Finally, a brief discussion of how this data is used in a new launch vehicle 
explosion model for improving crew/payload survival is presented. 
INTRODUCTION 
In order to assess crew survivability during an abort from an exploding rocket, the Launch 
Vehicle (LV) explosion environment must be accurately described. This is also true for the 
assessment of particularly dangerous payloads such as those containing radioactive material.  
The LV explosion environment can be broken down into three broad categories: blast wave, 
fragmentation, and thermal effects. For many years the typical approach to modeling a LV 
explosion has been to equate a particular percentage of the onboard propellant to high explosive 
and use the well-known high explosive curves [1] to predict such aspects as overpressure, 
impulse, and wave speed. Although this method is simple and can be useful in certain 
circumstances, it is known that it does not accurately capture the physics of rocket propellant 
explosions [2].  This is especially true in the near field where crew and sensitive payload 
survivability needs to be assessed. Since high explosives are by definition point-source 
supersonic combustion events, they predict extremely high overpressures in the near field, 
whereas Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) explosions can contain large volumes of pressurized gas as 
well as solid propellant that may or may not detonate.  Therefore, empirical SRB explosion data 
was sought to clarify near field effects for these unique type of explosions. 
As an initial step, a literature review was conducted in an effort to locate data from full-
scale LV explosion accidents and tests.  This effort sought data on all types of LVs, not just those 
with SRBs.  Trips were taken to several libraries and launch sites to collect data.  The goal of the 
data collection was to build empirical models of LV explosions so that a more accurate model 
could be used for survivability assessments, and to aid in developing improved analytical and 
numerical models.  Most of the empirical data were found in declassified LV accident reports. 
This search was limited to SRBs of at least 10,000lbs of propellant, with the exception of one 
STAR 48 destruct test.  The arbitrary weight limitation was used to both make the study 
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manageable and to reduce the possibility of unknown scale effects.  Currently, 25 accidents or 
tests [3 - 23] met the criteria and had applicable documented SRB explosion data such as 
overpressure measurement, heat flux, fragment size, etc.   
A key distinction was made in the acquired test data between those tests that aimed to 
simulate a potential explosion scenario versus those that aimed to determine if an SRB could be 
made to detonate.  The latter category all contained significant amounts of High Explosive (HE), 
ranging from 10’s to 100’s of pounds, in an attempt to cause the propellant to detonate.  The 
former category only included Solid Rocket Motors (SRMs) that failed by case burst, linear shape 
charge destruct, impaling, or over-pressurization.  This HE-boosted category was deemed not 
applicable to the task at hand since crewed LVs do not typically fly with large amounts of high 
explosive.  However, data from this category was insightful and is included herein for comparison.  
A third category was defined as high velocity impacts.  To date, only data from this type of 
explosion has been collected.  Analysis on these high velocity impact explosions has yet to be 
performed since the focus of this study was crew survivability.  
A total of 12 accidents or applicable tests (not HE boosted) were found and shown in 
Table 1.  This paper specifically discusses the blast waves from these SRM explosions and a 
potential physical model to represent them.  SRM fragmentation data and a semi-empirical model 
generated from such is in a forthcoming report.  Also, a detailed description of cryogenic blast 
wave data and modeling efforts was produced in Blackwood [24].  For comparison, the data from 
HE initiated SRM explosion is included in Table 2.   
 
Table 1 List of Applicable SRM Tests and Accidents 
SRM Date Reference 
Minute Man Missile 12 April 1966 7 
Minute Man 2nd Stage 4 May 1960 9 
Minute Man  15 May 1961 8 
Titan IV SRMU 1 April 1991 11, 19  
MX Stage 3 19 March 1982 10 
MX Stage 2 30 June 1982 10 
MX Stage 1 4 May 1982 10 
Titan III 1202-1 28 March 1964 18 
STS-51L 28 Jan 1986 12 
Titan 34D-9 18 April 1986 12, 25 
Delta II 17 Jan 1997 17, 21, 23 
STAR 48 15 Feb 2002 22, 26 
 
 
Table 2 List of Non-applicable (HE Initiated) SRM Tests and Accidents 
SRM Date Reference 
Titan III C 624A Oct 1964 14 
Polaris (X2) June 1965 – Feb 1968 16 
Minuteman Missile June 1965 – Feb 1968 16 
Minuteman Missile June 1965 – Feb 1968 16 
Bureau of Naval Weapons SRM (X2) 18 Nov 1964 6 
Bureau of Naval Weapons SRM (X2) 20 Nov 1964 6 
Bureau of Naval Weapons SRM (X2) 8 Jan 1965 6 
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Bureau of Naval Weapons SRM (X2) 16 Mar 1965 6 
Bureau of Naval Weapons SRM (X2) 17 Mar 1965 6 
Minute Man 2nd Stage 13 April 1960 8, 9 
Minute Man 2nd Stage 12 Jan 1961 8, 9 
Thiokol Minuteman Subscale 13 Sept 1960 8, 9 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
OVERPRESSURE 
When the peak overpressure measurements are plotted from the tests that used 
significant portions of HE (those in Table 2) a clear trend is shown as seen in Figure 1.  The black 
line in Figure 1 represents the peak overpressure from a theoretical 20,000lbs of TNT.  It has the 
same general trend as the HE-initiated SRMs and follows many of them in the near field.  TNT 
equivalencies for these tests vary greatly depending on distance chosen for equivalency, but 
several tests can have more than 100% equivalency.  Peak measured overpressures are in the 
100’s of psi.   
Impulse — the area under the overpressure curve — for the same HE-initiated SRM 
explosions is plotted in Figure 2.  The black line is the impulse from a theoretical 20,000lb TNT 
surface explosion.  As with the peak overpressure, this line follows the trend of the impulse data.  
And as before, any TNT equivalence can be picked to match each test given a particular distance 
from the center of explosion.  Most would range from 10% to over 100% equivalence.   
 
Figure 1 Peak Overpressure from SRMs initiated by High Explosives 
 
Figure 2 Impulse from SRMs initiated by High Explosives 
As opposed to Figure 1, SRMs shown in Figure 3 contain rockets that were either over-
pressurized to the point of failure, impaled on cutters while firing, or destroyed with linear shaped 
charges while firing.  The only HE used in these tests or accidents was that of the normal destruct 
system.  When the peak overpressures measurements for these “normally” exploding SRMs are 
compared to those that were initiated with HE a different trend appears.  For reference, the black 
line in Figure 3 is the same theoretical 20,000lbs of TNT.  If calculated, the TNT equivalencies for 
this class of SRM explosion would be extremely small, suggesting that a high explosive model for 
these explosions is a poor fit to the data.   
 
 
Figure 3 Peak Overpressure for “Normally” Exploding SRMs 
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Figure 4 compares the two classes of SRM explosions.  The grey overpressure 
measurements contain SRMs that used a significant amount (typically between 50 and 100lbs) of 
HE to initiate the explosion.  The blue measurements are for SRM explosions that contained no 
HE other than the amount contained in the range destruct devices.  When compared on the same 
scale these two classes of SRM explosions appear to produce very different magnitudes of 
explosions.   
 
Figure 4 HE-initiated vs. “Normal” SRM Explosions 
 
WAVE SPEED 
A limited amount of wave speed data was found for SRM explosions above 10,000lbs of 
propellant, as seen in Figure 5.  Out of the five cases with wave speed data, four fit into the 
“normal” explosion category.  One, the Titan III C 624A test impacted the burning motor into a 
concrete wall at 667 feet per second.  Unfortunately, no wave speed data was found for any of 
the HE-initiated SRM explosions.  The black line in Figure 5 is the speed of sound in ambient 
temperature.   
The “normal” explosions can be seen to be slightly subsonic in the near field and then 
form into an acoustic wave.  The Titan IV SRMU that failed at approximately 1800psi [11] is 
slightly supersonic in the near field, although the hot gases produced in the near field may have 
affected the sound speed.  The one test that shows a clear trend beyond sonic is the 624A case.  
As with all blast waves it eventually decays to a sonic wave.  This wave speed data seems to 
indicate that “normal” SRM explosions do not act like high explosives with their supersonic wave 
speeds, but are rather sonic events.  This suggests that a non-TNT model might be a better fit for 
this class of SRM explosions.   
 
 
Figure 5 Measured Blast Wave Speed for a Few SRM explosions 
FRAGMENTS 
Speeds were calculated for 64 individual fragments emanating from the Titan IV SRMU 
explosion via video analysis [19].  For most of these fragments a two-dimensional (2D) speed 
was calculated, but for 22 of these fragments enough video imaging was available to calculate a 
three-dimensional (3D) speed.  These speeds are shown in Figure 6.  The average speed 
difference between the 2D estimation and the 3D measurement is less than 10%, therefore the 
2D speeds are deemed sufficient for analysis.  As can be seen in Figure 6 all the measured 
speeds are at or below Mach 1, with the average speed at 235 ft/s.  These relatively low fragment 
speeds seem to be in good agreement with the relatively low overpressure measurements 
(Figure 3) and Mach 1 blast wave speeds (Figure 5).  The data trends indicate range destruct or 
case burst failures of a solid rocket motor are an acoustic or thermodynamic type event and not a 
HE or supersonic detonation.  It should be noted that even though these fragments are going 
relatively slow they still can have a large amount of kinetic energy – a key factor in conducting 
loss of crew or structure calculations.  Using the estimated and measured masses of the 
fragments shown in Figure 6 and their individual speeds, the average kinetic energy is 5 MJ.  This 
is several orders of magnitude greater than even the highest power rifles.   
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Figure 6 Titan SRMU Fragment Speeds 
PRESSURE BURST MODEL 
Given that all the data found for “normal” SRM explosions appears to be a non-HE-type 
event, a different theory is proposed. Since the detonation of the solid propellant does not seem 
to be the source of the blast energy, the stored gas energy (U = PdV) in the pressurized chamber 
was modeled to determine if there is enough energy to produce the magnitude of overpressures 
that have been measured during “normal” SRM explosions.  The model used is one proposed by 
Baker [27] for spherical and cylindrical pressure vessel bursts.  Calculations and estimations are 
made for various inputs for each of the “normal” SRM explosions at the appropriate burn time for 
their respective explosions, such as bore volume, chamber pressure, and heat capacity ratio.  
Given the uncertainties in these input values for these SRMs at the time of explosion, error bars 
are calculated for 10 of the measured overpressure values.  These are represented in Figure 7.  
The error bars cover every one of the 10 measured overpressure values.  This indicates that a 
pressure vessel burst model can accurately predict the blast wave properties of an exploding 
SRM assuming the SRM failed from over-pressurizing, range destruct, or case wall defects.  This 
model is not appropriate for SRM explosions resulting from high velocity impacts or those initiated 
by significant (10’s or more pounds) amounts of high explosives.   
If the pressure vessel burst model is correct for “normal” SRM explosions then several 
ramifications are immediately apparent.  First, propellant weight is not a primary driver of the blast 
wave properties, thereby eliminating the ability to use TNT equivalency.  Second, since the hot 
gas volume inside an SRM increases with time, then the blast energy is at a minimum at launch 
and increases during flight.  This assumes the pressure inside the SRM remains somewhat 
constant.  At some point near burnout, the pressure does decrease enough to overcome the 
increased effect of volume.  Finally, shock wave formation occurs more rapidly as the SRM 
increases in altitude.  Again, assuming the pressure inside the SRM stays somewhat constant, 
the relative pressure from inside the SRM to the ambient pressure increase and can approach 
infinity if atmospheric pressure approaches zero.   
 
Figure 7 Peak Overpressure Predictions Using Pressure Vessel Burst Model 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A literature review for large SRM explosion environments was conducted. Measurements 
of peak overpressure, blast wave speed, and fragment speed were found.  All data suggests that 
typical SRM explosions are not similar to high explosives.  Peak overpressures are low, wave 
speeds are near sonic and fragments tend to go much slower than Mach 1.  Only when 10’s to 
100’s of pounds of HE were used to initiate the SRM explosion did the explosions start to look 
similar to a high explosive event.    
A pressure vessel burst model, which is independent of the amount of solid propellant, 
has been employed that reproduces the measured peak overpressure data.  This model can be 
used to make assessment of crew, payload, or pad structure survival, in the event of a 
catastrophic SRM explosion.   
FUTURE WORK 
Since this work was only focused on SRMs that were initiated by typical failure modes, a 
similar process could be undertaken for high velocity impact cases.  This scenario may be of 
particular interest to range personnel.  Preliminary analysis shows the high velocity impact case 
to be significantly different than the normal failure modes assessed here.   
Additional work by the authors has produced a semi-empirical model for SRM explosion 
fragment generation.  This fragment model can be coupled with the pressure vessel burst model 
to accelerate each individual fragment, for a complete SRM explosion model.   
If a pressure vessel burst is indeed the correct physical impetus for these types of 
explosions then this opens up the opportunity for inert propellant testing.  An inert SRM can be 
fabricated, plugged, pressurized, and failed in order to measure the number, size, mass, and 
speed of the fragments.  In the past, this type of test has used burning propellant.  The 
combustion products have obscured much of the area where fragment speed data needs to be 
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collected.  Also, the burning propellant fragments leave no way to measure the initial mass or size 
of the fragments.  These issues could potentially be eliminated by conducting this type of test, 
without sacrificing accuracy.   
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